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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH AND SEIZURE LEGISLATIONTHE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
STATE V. GARCIA, 123 S.W.3D 335 (TENN. 2003)
I. Introduction
On May 9, 1999, at approximately 10:50 p.m., the defendant was stopped by Officer Debra Kohl of the
Metropolitan Nashville Police Department while driving in Davidson County in Nashville, Tennessee.1
Kohl, whom had worked for the police department for eleven years, had been assigned to the Judicial
District Drug Task Force2 approximately eight months before stopping the defendant.3
Officer Kohl testified that on the evening of the stop, she had just completed an unrelated traffic stop.4
She was traveling in a marked police cruiser when she noticed that the defendant’s car had begun to swerve
onto the line demarcating the right boundary of its lane.5 Noticing the erratic driving, Kohl slowed her
patrol car and began monitoring the defendant’s vehicle. 6 After trailing the vehicle, Kohl came to the
conclusion that the driver of the vehicle (the defendant) was driving carelessly.7 Kohl testified:
The vehicle would drive in its lane--it stayed in its lane of traffic; but, as the vehicle was
going in its lane of traffic, it would go to the left-lane marker, then it would swerve over
to the right-lane marker, then it would swerve over to the left-lane marker. And I became
concerned for his safety, as well as the safety of other motorists, and decided to stop the
vehicle, at that point in time.8
Kohl further stated that she suspected the defendant could be intoxicated. 9 Kohl stopped the defendant’s
vehicle and approached it from the passenger side.10 When she reached the door, she motioned for the
defendant to roll down the window, which he did.11 Kohl introduced herself as a Nashville Metro Police
Officer. However, Kohl stated, the defendant appeared confused, so she asked the defendant if he spoke
Spanish. The defendant replied, “Yes.”12 Kohl then asked the defendant to exit the car and follow her to the
rear of the vehicle.13 Officer Kohl then stated to the defendant, in Spanish: “I’m a police officer in
Nashville, Tennessee. The reason I stopped you was for a moving violation. The moving violation was
weaving.”14 The defendant responded, in English, “I was weaving.”15 Kohl assumed that the defendant
sufficiently knew English because of his reply, thus they continued the remainder of the conversation in
English.16
Officer Kohl then asked the defendant whether or not he had been drinking alcohol. She stated that,
despite her question, she did not believe the defendant was intoxicated and noticed that the defendant did
not act as if he was intoxicated.17 “In fact, Kohl testified that two minutes into the traffic stop, she was
satisfied that the defendant was not intoxicated.”18 Moreover, Kohl testified that, though she did observe
the defendant weaving, she did not observe the defendant “speed, drive too slowly, cross any lanes of
traffic, illegally pass another vehicle, follow too closely, commit a violation regarding use of the turning
signal, or drive on the shoulder.”19 Kohl asked the defendant if he was tired. He responded that he was tired
because he left Los Angeles the day before and had only stopped briefly.20 The defendant then told the
officer, upon her inquiry, that he was traveling to Georgia.21 Kohl stated that the defendant gave
inconsistent answers regarding his destination as well as the ownership of the vehicle. She checked and
learned that the car was not stolen and the registration matched the vehicle.22
Kohl continued to question the defendant about his driving record and police records.23 Then, she
decided to issue the defendant a warning24 citation.25 Next, Officer Kohl instructed the defendant to wait in
his vehicle.26 She retained the defendant’s license and registration, and returned to her patrol car where
radioed for another officer to transport a drug-detection dog to the scene.27 Finally, Officer Kohl prepared a
warning citation for a violation of “lane restrictions,” and wrote out a “Consent to Search” form in
Spanish.28 She then returned to the defendant’s vehicle and motioned for the defendant to get out of his car.
She returned his license and vehicle registration and stated, “The stop’s complete.29
The defendant turned to return to his car. Officer Kohl turned “as though to return to her vehicle” and
then quickly turned around and asked the defendant if she could ask him a few more questions.30 She asked
the defendant if he was carrying any weapons or had any long-bladed knives in his vehicle; to which the
defendant replied, “No.”31 Kohl then asked the defendant if he had any illegal drugs in his vehicle; the
defendant answered, “No.”32 Kohl testified that at this time, the defendant’s demeanor changed.33
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He gave me a—a nervous, laughing, “No.” And he—he became fidgety. You could see
him scratching on his back. He was nervous and you could literally see his Adam[s]
apple, a nervous sign, bobbing up and down, when I was talking to him, which, to me, is
an indicator of some type of deception.34
Officer Kohl asked the defendant for permission to search the vehicle and Kohl claimed that the defendant
promptly gave her permission35 to inspect the trunk.36 Officer Kohl declined and asked him to read the
“Consent to Search” form she had prepared in Spanish37.38 The consent form stated that the defendant had a
right to refuse consent39, the right to limit portions of the vehicle, as well as the right to revoke his consent
at any time.40 The defendant read41 the form, printed his name, and then signed the form.42
Officer Dean Hunter, who had arrived with his drug-detection dig prior to the defendant signing
the consent form, permitted the dog to smell around the vehicle.43 The dog indicated that he detected the
presence of illegal drugs on both the driver and passenger side of the vehicle so the two officers began to
search the vehicle.44 The officers began to do an in-depth search of the vehicle; examining the interior of
the vehicle as well as the vehicle’s rocker panels.45 Continuing the search inside the rocker panels, the
officers eventually found “duct-taped bundles” of cocaine inside the panels.46 Officer Kohl then placed the
defendant under arrest and laboratory results tested that the bundles contained 40.1 pounds of
methamphetamine.47
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop48.
Following conviction of the jury trial, the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the
ruling on the suppression.49 The defendant appealed by permission. On certiorari to the Tennessee Supreme
Court, held, reversed. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the evidence found as a result of the
illegal seizure of the defendant was subject to suppression because it was the result of an illegal seizure and
the defendant’s consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful seizure.50
On May 28, 2003, the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee convened to hear arguments presented
by both parties regarding whether the evidence51 collected as part of the illegal stop should be suppressed.52
First, the court analyzed whether the traffic stop was based upon “reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.”53 Next, the court considered whether the defendant’s consent to search his vehicle was
“sufficiently attenuated from the [] stop.”54 The court reviewed, in light of the consent given, whether the
evidence from the illegal detainment should be suppressed and the convictions from the lower courts
reversed. The question before the court was, in light of the facts, whether the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated by the seizure and subsequent search by Officer Kohl.55

II.

History and Scope of Search and Seizure Legislation

The exclusionary rule is a key element in the Fourth Amendment because it deters police officers from
unreasonably holding or searching citizens. It forces police officers to have “reasonable suspicion”56 that
the person is about to commit a crime before an officer may legally detain them. The exclusionary rule, or
the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine57,” precludes the admissibility of evidence that is the direct result of
a violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights as well as any evidence obtained by an exploitation
of that violation.58 “The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is
that [the evidence should not be used before a court at all]. . . . [T]he knowledge gained by the
government’s own wrong cannot be used . . . .”59
Fourth Amendment
The right to privacy has been seen as a fundamental human right and ought to be protected at all costs.
The maxim, “[e]very man’s house is his castle” was strictly enforced and highly respected in England as a
right of every citizen.60 The idea behind the law was, a man had a right to protect his home, even against
agents of the King.61 However, the King’s agents could break and enter the house of another upon notice to
arrest or otherwise carryout the lawful commands of the King.62
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that, “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause.” 63The Founding Fathers intended for the Fourth Amendment to prevent unwarranted64 and
unreasonable65 invasion of the privacy of the homes of citizens.66 The intent of the Founding Fathers was
to protect citizens from police invasion into private homes that did not directly correlate with reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity.67 They created the amendment to prevent police from having absolute control
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and reign over the streets by governing their ability to enter into the private sphere of citizens.68 The
amendment did not create any new rights; rather it was created to protect rights the Founding Fathers
believed were basic human rights.69 The amendment was not enacted because government officials
believed that police would invariably be corrupt and abuse their powers.70 Rather, it was created as a
safeguard against the possibility of corruption.71 “The Fourth Amendment was not a construct based on
abstract considerations of political theory, but was drafter by the framers for the express purpose of
providing enforceable safeguards against a recurrence of highhanded search measures which Americans, as
well as the people of England, had recently experienced.”72
The Fourth Amendment underwent countless revisions before it was finalized into the today’s statute.73
The language of the Fourth Amendment experienced modest changes on its passage through the Congress,
and it is possible that the changes reflected more than a modest significance in the interpretation of the
relationship of the two clauses of the amendment. Madison’s introduced version provided:
“The rights to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and other property,
from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued
without probably cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing
the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.”74
Over the years, Courts have faithfully recognized the intent of the Founding Fathers in their creation
of the Fourth Amendment and have upheld its spirit in order to protect the privacy of Americans. However,
Courts have differed on the interpretations of the terms under the Fourth Amendment, “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” The Supreme Court, in its opinion of Boyd v. United States75, addressed the
historical importance of the Fourth Amendment.76 “The practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing
writs of assistance to the revenue officer, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected pleases
for smuggled goods. . . .”77 This was seen as the “worst instrument of arbitrary power . . .”78 In Entick v.
Carirington and Three Other King’s Messengers, on the authority of the Secretary of State, John Wilke’s
home was searched and his papers seized in order to discover evidence to convict him for libel.79 The
English court was outraged and awarded Wilkes one thousand pounds against one of the parties who had
made the search and four thousand pounds against the Secretary of State for issuing the warrant.80 This case
was monumental in British history and had a strong impact on the Founding Fathers’ wording of the
American Constitution, specifically the Fourth Amendment.81
Vagrancy Laws: The Power of Broad Discretion Given to Police
While the purpose of the Fourth Amendment has always been to protect the right to privacy, it has not
always been so strictly applied to street level policing.82 “Before the late 1960s, policing on the street was
basically unregulated.”83 Police did not have to adhere to the strict rules of “reasonably suspicion” in order
to search and arrest citizens on the street. Police were able to circumvent rules for “reasonable suspicion”
through vagrancy laws. The Code for the District of Columbia defined vagrants as, “‘any person wandering
abroad and lodging . . .in the open air, and not giving a good account of himself’84 is a vagrant.”85 The D.C.
Code also defined vagrant as “[a]ny person who wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of the
night without any visible or lawful business and not giving a good account of himself.”86
Vagrancy laws broadly gave police the power and discretion to arrest citizens on suspicion of a crime,
no matter how unwarranted.87 Police were able to arrest citizens even when the arrest might otherwise be
unlawful.88 Often times, vagrancy arrests were cover-ups for other crimes which the police could not
prove.89 One incident involved a group of waterfront strikers in California who were convicted of vagrancy
when, in reality, their arrests were the result of police crack downs on citizens they labeled as “radicals.”90
“[L]oitering and vagrancy laws were sufficiently broad to give the police authority to stop or arrest
almost anyone, or at least, anyone they were plausibly interested in stopping or arresting.” 91 Arrests on
vagrancy were often devices for making “an arrest on suspicion.”92 Vagrancy laws gave police the power
and authority to have unregulated control of the streets with no set guidelines as to how to go about
searching citizens or when they are allowed to search citizens. The rationale behind vagrancy laws was that
vagrants were “a potential menace to the community” and who was in the better position than police who
were on the streets everyday to make these judgments? Perkins wrote in The Vagrancy Concept, “[i]n
metropolitan centers . . . the vagrancy law is one of the most effective weapons in the arsenal of law
enforcement, and if the officer’s use of this weapon should be seriously impaired the security of the citizen
would be grievously weakened.”93
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“Not until the latter half of the 1960’s, when those loitering and vagrancy laws started to fall to
vagueness challenges94, did ordinary police-citizen encounters on the street become a serious Fourth
Amendment issue.95 Citizens began to challenge their arrests on vagrancy and cases involving vagrancy
arrest began to flood the courts. In 1958, there were 7,367 persons arrested for vagrancy, and all of them
were later released.96 It wasn’t until Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (Ohio 1968)97 that the Supreme Court
attempted to use legal tools to govern police behavior in the streets.98
It became important to monitor police behavior in order to, not only protect the rights of citizens, but
also to prevent forced confessions by persons interrogated (sometimes violently) and intimidated by
police.99 Citizens were often times intimidated by police and there was a “coercive influence” in
questioning a suspect in a police station.100 In Terry, the court articulated its disdain for police misconduct
and identified punishments, such as the exclusionary rule, for evidence taken improperly from persons
whose rights have been violated.

III.

History of the “Exclusionary Rule”: Terry v. Ohio

Critics argue that the exclusionary rule prevent officers from freely doing their job of keeping streets
safe and arresting criminals. Terry v. Ohio is the first time the United States Supreme Court addressed the
problem of police behavior on street and whether police had the right to “stop and frisk” (or seize and
search) citizens without evidence to warrant “reasonable suspicion”101. As argued in Terry, it is frequently
argued that:
[D]istinctions should be made between a “stop” and an “arrest” (or a “seizure” of a
person), and between a “frisk” and a “search.”. . . police should be allowed to “stop” a
person and detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he may be connected
with criminal activity. Upon suspicion that the person may be armed, the police should
have the power to “frisk” him for weapons. If the “stop” and the “frisk” give rise to
probably cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime, then the police should
be empowered to make a formal “arrest,” and a full incident “search” of the person.102
The court justified this argument by stating that “a ‘stop’ and ‘frisk’ amount to a mere ‘minor
inconvenience and petty indignity’ which can properly be imposed on the citizen in the interest of effective
law enforcement on the basis of a police officer’s suspicion.”103 State v. Riviera104, supports this argument,
stating:
[T]he evidence needed to make the inquiry is not of the same degree of conclusiveness as
that required for an arrest. The stopping of the individual to inquire is not an arrest and
the ground upon which the police may make the inquiry may be less incriminating that
the ground for an arrest for a crime known to have been committed. . . .And as the right
to stop and inquire is to be justified for a cause les conclusive then that which would
sustain an arrest, so the right to frisk may be justified as an incident to inquiry upon
grounds of elemental safety and precautions which might not initially sustain a search . . .
.105
Furthermore, some critics have argued that the exclusionary rule allows known criminals to circumvent
prosecution through a “loop hole” of the judicial system. However, the exclusionary rule does not prevent
officers from arresting criminals, it simply calls for the officer to make more stringent judgment calls as to
whom they label as “suspects.”
“On the other side of the argument is made that the authority of the police must be strictly
circumscribed by the law of arrest and search as it has developed [to reflect] the Fourth Amendment.”106
The exclusionary rules does not take away police power, rather it challenges officers to have more
evidentiary proof before detaining citizens and invading their privacy to search for evidence of criminal
activity. The exclusionary rule simply reverses the order of police investigation; making police have some
type of evidentiary proof to support a “reasonable suspicion” that the detainee will participate in some kind
of criminal activity. The exclusionary rule reiterates the purpose of the Fourth Amendment by making it “a
severe requirement of specific justification [before an officer may make] any intrusion [into] protected
personal security [of citizens].”107
The Terry court echoed these arguments in its opinion, “[r]eflective of the tensions involved [in this
argument] are the practical and constitutional arguments pressed with great vigor on both sides of the
public debate over the power of the police to “stop and frisk” [persons who have not been arrested]108.”109
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IV.

Illegal Search and Seizure

The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct.110 If a police officer
“seizes” a citizen without a warrant or without “probable cause;” that seizure is unconstitutional and any
evidence gained there from is seen as “fruit of the poisonous tree” and subject to suppression.
Seizure
Courts have differed on exactly what may constitute the “seizure” of a defendant under the Fourth
Amendment. It should be noted that the Fourth Amendment does not “proscribe all contact between the
police and citizens, but is designed ‘to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement
officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.’”111 However, the Supreme Court has stated
that it is hesitant to strictly define limits on police-citizen encounters due to the diversity of interactions the
two may have.112
State v. Pully113, held that a police officer merely approaching a vehicle in a parked public place
and asking for driver identification and vehicle registration without any reasonable suspicion of illegal
activity was not a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.114 However, “[u]pon turning on
the blue lights of a vehicle, a police officer has clearly initiated a stop”115 and has seized the subject of the
stop within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, section 7 of
the Tennessee Constitution.116 The Supreme Court of Utah echoed these beliefs in State v. Hansen, holding
that “‘[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a “seizure” within the meaning of the
[Fourth] Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite
brief.’”117 The Terry court further defined a “seizure” as whenever a police officer restrains the freedom of
a person to walk away. 118
Physical force is another means by which an officer may “seize” a person.119 The Terry court
recognized that physically restraining a person is, of course, a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment
analysis, clearly because no reasonable person that has been physically restrained by police officers would
feel free to walk away120. The Court stated that while not all police and citizen interactions involve
“seizures,” “when an officer by means of physical force or show of authority has restrained the liberty of a
citizen we may conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”121
The test to be applied in analyzing whether a person is “seized” is measured by a reasonable
person standard and whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe they are “seized”
or if they have the right to walk away from the police officer.122 The courts have increasingly recognized
that, generally, once citizens are in the custody of police officers, they generally do not feel as if they have
the ability to leave, thus they reasonably deduce that they have been “seized” even though there has been
no formal arrest. In State v. Anderson123the Tennessee Supreme Court held that courts may determine
whether a person is “seized” depends on the totality of the circumstances.
Factors which may be considered include time, duration, location and character of the
interview, the tone and demeanor of the officer . . . the number of law enforcement
officials present, limitations or restraints placed on the suspect’s movement, interaction
between the suspect and the questioning officer, . . . and whether the suspect is informed
that he or she may refuse to answer questions and may end the questioning at any time.124
These factors are important because they do not rely solely on the objective language of the officer, but also
factor in the subjective feelings of the detainee. If an officer communicates to a detainee that they are free
to leave after a traffic stop, however the officer stands directly in front of the detainee, or the detainee
remains surrounded by police officers, then reasonably, the detainee would not feel free to leave.
In I.N.S. v. Delgado125, the Supreme Court held that the interrogation of the employees did not
amount to a Fourth Amendment “seizure” the I.N.S. agents were acting pursuant to two warrants which
gave them permission to question the citizenship of the employees. Nevertheless, the court stated that an
“[i]nterrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for identification by the police [can] constitute a
Fourth Amendment seizure [if] the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate
that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded. . . .”126
However, a traffic stop may stop being a “seizure” and become a consensual encounter. In
Hansen, the court found that a “traffic stop that begins as a seizure may de-escalate to a mere consensual
encounter.”127 “[It] de-escalates to a consensual encounter when a reasonable person would believe, based
on the totality of the circumstances, that he or she is free to end the encounter and depart.”128 However, if a
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reasonable person would not feel free to depart from the investigation of the officer, the traffic stop is not
over and the encounter remains “an investigatory detention.”129
The Hansen court further articulated that a traffic stop cannot reasonably end until all documents
belonging to the detainee, such as driver’s license and vehicle registration, have been returned to the
detainee.130 Thus the question of whether a “seizure” has occurred lies in a fact based analysis of objective
and subjective standards, applying a test of whether a reasonable person in the position of the detainee
would believe that they have been “seized” by a police officer or whether they have the freedom to
discontinue the encounter.
Reasonable Suspicion Required for Seizure
The Fourth Amendment requires that any search and seizure of persons or their property must be
reasonable.131 The requirement for reasonableness developed as a means to “safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions of government officials.”132 The legislature sought to
prevent police from having the free reigning power that they had at the time vagrancy laws were enforced.
In order to prevent this broad discretion of police power, the courts began to enforce the requirement under
the Fourth Amendment that any police searches or seizures be based on reasonableness.133
Reasonable suspicion is not a subjective standard.134 “[I]t must be based upon a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person . . . of criminal activity.”135 The determination of
whether a stop is “reasonable” is a fact determinative question, thus specific facts are key to a
“reasonableness” analysis. It requires “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” an investigatory stop.136 This heightened requirement of
specificity in support of a “reasonable” belief that someone was about to engage in criminal activity acted
as a safeguard against ambiguous and broad police discretion and potential abuse of that authority. The
government did not want police to be able to invade the privacy of citizens at their own will. They placed
safeguards in place in order to ensure that if some police officer was corrupt, then the innocent citizen
would have laws in place to protect from any unreasonable, bad faith search.
“The evidence offered as grounds for reasonable suspicion is to be viewed using a common sense
approach, as understood by those in the field of law enforcement.”137
Whether an officer formed the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion during a traffic
stop under a “totality of the circumstances” analysis. This means that we must determine
whether the individual factors, taken as a whole, give rise to reasonable suspicion, even if
each individual factor is entirely consistent with innocent behavior when examined
separately.138
Searches that derive from an illegal seizure (a seizure not based upon reasonable suspicion) is held
illegal and thus the evidence is subject to suppression. Moreover, because warrant-less searches are held
per se illegal, then evidence gathered from a warrant-less search is also considered “fruit of the poisonous
tree” and subject to suppression.
Consent to Search
Though generally, the exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evidence obtained in violation
of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, it will not always hold evidence obtained as a result of police
misconduct as “‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because the evidence would not have come to light but
for the illegal actions of the police.” 139 If a detainee, after being unlawfully held, consents to a police
search, then the search is not a violation of the detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights and the evidence will
not be suppressed at trial.
However, whether or not a defendant is in custody is a major factor as to whether a defendant’s
consent is held valid. In United States ex rel. Holloway v. Reincke140, the court held that, where the
defendant unlocked his room for the officers who had him in custody and consented to their searching it,
there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant’s consent was “freely and unequivocally” given
because the defendant was in custody. “[T]he consent was not preceded by a voluntary confession, and he
did not actively co-operate in the search [thus his consent was not valid].”141 “However in Shaeffer v.
State142 . . . the court expressly declined to rule that, as a matter of law, a person who is in police custody
cannot, since coercion is inherent in such custody, consent to a search and seizure.”143 Moreover, an illegal
seizure does not per se render consent from the defendant invalid. 144
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In, Brown v. Illinois145 the Supreme Court articulated three major factors in for determining
whether consent attained after an illegal seizure would be valid. Although the Brown factors were
specifically aimed at determining whether a confession (and not a consent) was obtained by exploitation of
an illegal arrest (as opposed to an illegal seizure), these factors have also been used to evaluate a
connection between unlawful seizure and a following consent.146 The Brown factors are: 1) the temporal
proximity of the illegal seizure and consent; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) the
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.147
Many courts have used the first Brown factor in analyzing whether consent was valid after an
illegal seizure148. “The purpose of an attenuation analysis is found in the basic truth that the government
must use lawful means to achieve its objectives. This includes not seizing a citizen to unearth wrongdoing
except under well-defined circumstances.”149 Analyzing the proximity of the defendant’s consent to the
illegal seizure is key to determining whether the defendant’s consent was freely given.
A defendant may give consent, technically by signing a form, but that consent can be influenced by
factors, such as fear or intimidation, that have carried over from the original, unlawful stop. Clearly the
court does not recognize a coercion in a lengthy passage of time, however the court will recognize coercion
if the passage of time is short between the unlawful stop and the consent.150 “The attenuation analysis
evaluates the relationship between official misconduct and subsequently discovered evidence to determine
if excluding the evidence will effectively deter future illegalities.”151
A reasonable defendant may not feel that, at a time closely following the unlawful seizure, they
have the ability to refuse consent to a police officer. Generally, people are intimidated by police and do not
feel as if they have the ability to refuse consent to a police search, even if the police officer unequivocally
conveys to the defendant that they have the right to freely refuse consent, either before the search or any
time during the search. Courts analyze the attenuation of the consent by the proximity in time of the illegal
stop in order to prevent police officers from unlawfully stopping a citizen, ending the illegal seizure, and
then quickly asking the defendant’s consent to another, often unrelated search whereby the police officer
may find incriminating evidence.
Evidence found pursuant to an illegal seizure and absent the defendant’s un-coerced, freely given
consent to search is considered “fruit of the poisonous tree” and subject to suppression at trial.

V.

State v. Garcia: More than a Simple “Stop and Frisk”

In State v. Garcia, Justice Barker152, writing for the majority, addressed whether a police officer, after
observing a suspect weave in their own lane, has reasonable suspicion to stop a person and whether if
immediately after interrogating the person, the police officer may gain voluntary consent from the person to
search his vehicle when the person has not violated any laws, has not given any factually based reason to
make the police officer believe he will commit a crime, there is more than one officer present, and there has
not been sufficient attenuation from the illegal stop and the voluntary consent153. The court addressed
whether, in light of a voluntary consent from the defendant to search, evidence gained from an illegal
traffic stop is subject to suppression at trial.154 The court adopted the reasonableness standard155 in
determining whether a defendant’s voluntary consent was indeed, voluntary, and not influenced by
coercion or intimidation. In the four-one decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a “warrantless
search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and the evidence discovered as a result hereof is subject to
suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the
narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement [such as consent from the defendant, properly
attained with sufficient attenuation from an illegal seizure].”156
Justice Barker began his analysis by analyzing the standard of review for a motion to suppress.157
Applying the standard the court articulated in State v. Odom158the court held that they could review the
determination of whether the traffic stop was based upon reasonable suspicion de novo with no
presumption of correctness.159 He contrasted the case with State v. Binnette160, stating that in Garcia, the
State presented testimony of Officer Kohl in supplement of the videotape of the traffic stop. This was a
mixed question of fact and law; thus the video was reviewed de novo while affording the trial court some
deference to the findings of fact from Officer Kohl’s testimony.
The court analyzed two major points in the case. First, it analyzed whether the traffic stop initiated by
Officer Kohl was based upon “reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a
criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.”161 The court relied on an earlier ruling from the
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United States Supreme Court which stated in Alabama v. White, that “[i]n determining whether a police
officer’s reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable facts, a court must consider the
totality of the circumstances.”162 Second, the court analyzed whether the voluntary consent given by the
defendant was given with sufficient attenuation from the traffic stop.
Justice Barker discussed whether there was actually a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and whether the seizure was based upon reasonable suspicion supported by specific and
articulable facts that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.163 The majority found that
there was a seizure.164 The court relied on Binette, that “[u]pon turning on the blue lights of a vehicle, a
police officer has clearly initiated a stop and has seized the subject of the stop within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.”165
Next, he analyzed whether Officer Kohl had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant by observing
the “totality of the situation.”166 After reviewing the videotape as well as the testimony of Officer Kohl at
trial, the court found that they were unable to detect any weaving that was either “exaggerated or
pronounced” so as to cause a reasonable suspicion in Officer Kohl that the defendant had been or was about
to commit a criminal act.167 Both the majority and the dissenting opinions of the Court of Criminal Appeals
concurred with this finding.168 However, the dissenting Justice Holder opined that there was “noticeable
and continual weaving” that would constitute sufficient reasonable suspicion.169 The court, finding that the
defendant was not weaving on the videotape, held that Officer Kohl did not have a reasonable suspicion to
stop the defendant. Thus, because there was no reasonable suspicion for which to stop the defendant, the
stop was illegal and violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Next, the court analyzed whether the consent given by the defendant to search his vehicle was
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal traffic stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the stop was
illegal; however the evidence would not be barred by the exclusionary rule because the defendant had
consented to the search.170 The Supreme Court of Tennessee took a different approach to the consent given
by the defendant. The court noted that a consent can be preceded by an illegal stop and not be “fruit of the
poisonous tree” if the consent is voluntary and not an exploitation of the prior illegal stop.171 The court
relied upon the factors articulated by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois. The Brown factors are the
temporal proximity of the illegal seizure and consent, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The court opined that the illegal detention began when
Officer Kohl turned on her blue police lights and stopped the defendant.172 The illegal detention did not end
until she stated that the stop was complete. The officer immediately asked the defendant whether she could
search the vehicle before either person could even return to their respective vehicles.173 Thus, “no
appreciable time passed between the defendant’s unlawful detention and the consent that would have
allowed the taint of the misconduct to dissipate.”174
Furthermore, the majority opinion considered the “flagrancy of the official misconduct.”175 Justice
Barker notes that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to prevent police misconduct.176 However, as the
court notes, Officer Kohl’s actions are suspicious because her actions at the stop do not support her
statements at trial.177 The court assumed that Officer Kohl subjectively believed that the defendant was
driving erratically and could possibly be under the influence of alcohol. However, as Justice Baker
discussed in his opinion, Officer Kohl stated at trial that she knew two minutes into the traffic stop that the
defendant was not drunk; however she retained his driver’s license and vehicle registration, she continued
to interrogate the defendant, and she took the time to write out the Consent to Search form in Spanish. If
her true reason for stopping the defendant was belief that he was driving under the influence of alcohol, she
knew, as she testified at trial, within two minutes of the stop that the defendant was indeed, not intoxicated.
Furthermore, Officer Kohl’s training and “status as a member of the drug task force adds to the likelihood
that her prolonged and unreasonable detention of the defendant was for the sole purpose of obtaining
consent to search his vehicle.”178 The continued detention of the defendant was unlawful and done in bad
faith because after the initial two minutes of the traffic stop, there was no “reasonable suspicion” that
warranted the seizure of the defendant.179 This led the majority to believe that Officer Kohl acted in bad
faith in her traffic stop of the defendant and subsequent permission to search his vehicle; and thus the
exclusionary rule would apply to the evidence because the purpose of the rule is to prevent police officers
from seizing persons in bad faith.180
Justice Holder disagreed with the majority’s reasoning. Relying on State v. Troxell181, she states “that
traffic stops are investigative stops”.182 She echoed the court’s prior decision in Simpson, stating that in
determining whether a detention was unreasonably excessive in length, the court must analyze whether “the
police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to dispel their suspicions quickly.”183
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Furthermore, Justice Holder relies on Smith, quoting “inconsistent information given to an officer during a
traffic stop may give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”184 Justice Holder argues that,
although Officer Kohl knew two minutes into the traffic stop that the defendant was not intoxicated, the
defendant’s evasive and inconsistent answers regarding his destination and the owner of the vehicle, along
with his implausible statement that he had left Los Angeles only the day before, gave Officer Kohl
reasonable suspicion to continue her investigation into the ownership of the vehicle.185 Reasonable
suspicion is a complex area of the law. While courts have attempted to articulate criteria that would define
what constitutes “reasonable suspicion186,” ultimately the determination of whether or not a police officer’s
actions were based upon reasonable suspicion, depends upon whether the trier of fact agrees with the
officer or the defendant.

VI.

Conclusion

Garcia re-emphasizes the tradition of American jurisprudence and American freedom. Garcia deals
with the question of whether police have the freedom to violate the privacy of citizens to search their
personal items to find evidence that would incriminate the potential defendant. Garcia does more than
merely restate and apply the law, it emphasizes just how important the law is to American history and the
American legal system. Recapping the facts, the defendant was actually in possession 40.1 pounds of
methamphetamine. The drugs, though discovered through illegal means, were evidence of a crime being
committed. However, the court decided to look past that illegality and uphold a tradition of disallowing the
police from invading the personal space of citizens without a warrant or reasonable suspicion. This
outcome demonstrates how strongly the courts regard the amendments to the United States Constitution,
particularly the Fourth Amendment.
Furthermore, the holding of the court in Garcia proves that courts will not easily find “reasonable
suspicion” in order to use, otherwise incriminating, evidence. The court disagrees on whether there was
actual “reasonable suspicion” either to stop the defendant or the subsequent continued detention of the
defendant. Clearly, the facts are not completely conclusive either way and reasonable minds may differ.
However, the court refuses to case a veil over “reasonable suspicion” in order to convict the defendant on
drug charges. Instead, the court takes a strict interpretation of “reasonable suspicion” and decides that,
instead of liberally interpreting the language and risking later courts misinterpreting the holding, they take
the safer approach of strictly construing the language so that in order to prevent future confusion. As a
result, while some people who may otherwise be guilty of a crime may be freed, this ruling prevents those
persons who would not be guilty from unfairly and illegally having their rights violated.
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